



A Taste of SANS SEC575 Part I: Invasion of the Mobile Phone Snatchers

Mobile Device Security and Ethical Hacking
Today's Focus: Mitigating the Stolen Device Threat

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Outline

What is SANS SEC575?

- Mobile Device Loss
- Mobile Device Backup Recovery
- Bypassing PIN Authentication
- Mitigating the Impact of Lost Devices
- Mobile Device Security


What is SEC575?

- A brand new 6-day course offering by SANS
- "Mobile Device Security and Ethical Hacking"
- Combining policy, architecture, defense and penetration testing
 - Hands-on exercises throughout, culminating in an in-depth Mobile Device Security Challenge event
- Covering Apple iOS (iPhone, iPad, iTouch), Android, BlackBerry and Windows Phone
- Written by Joshua Wright with leadership by Ed Skoudis as curriculum lead and advisor

Building the skills necessary for effective mobile device security

Mobile Device Security Philosophy

- A secure mobile device deployment requires:
 - Policy that is practical and enforced
 - Device management and architectural controls
 - In-depth application analysis
 - Network, wireless, web and mobile device penetration testing



Sampling of Topics

- US and intl. law influence on mobile device policies
- Managing enterprise-owned, BYOD or combined deployments
- Weaknesses in the Apple permission management model
- Critical features to look for in MDM solutions
- Mobile malware threats on iOS, Android and BlackBerry
- Rooting and unlocking mobile devices
- Reverse-engineering iOS and Android applications for security analysis
- Mobile device wireless network scanning
- Defeating WPA2 security on mobile devices
- Exploiting web applications disguised as mobile apps
- Extracting data from mobile device backups (today!)

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Mobile Device Loss

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Mitigating the Stolen Device Threat

- Mobile devices will be lost or stolen
 - Employees will misplace devices
 - High-tech devices are a common theft target
- Stolen devices introduces risk to the organization
 - Information and system access threats with stored credentials
- Organizations can manage the threat through preparation, policy, and device management



Differentiating Mobile Device Loss



- Employee loses mobile device
 - Accidental exposure to the organization
 - Loss is not an IT threat until it is retrieved
- Stolen device as an opportunistic threat
 - Access to device and configured resources a curiosity investigation
- Stolen device, targeted threat
 - When executed properly, attacker steals device silently to retain the window of loss reporting
 - Hours to days of device and system access

From a risk perspective, stolen devices as a targeted threat carry the most risk, though it is difficult to differentiate the device loss scenario.

Loss Impact

What can an attacker do with a stolen device?

- Access device resources locally
- Extract data from external storage devices
- Synchronize device to a computer to access backup data
 - Potentially returning the device to avoid disclosure
- Jailbreak/unlock/root to access filesystem-level resources
 - Access locally-stored authentication credentials for further system exploitation
 - Backdoor device prior to return


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iOS Backup Resources

- `Status.plist` - Status of last backup including date and time
- `Manifest.plist` - Third-party app backup information including app version numbers
- `Info.plist` - iOS device information
 - ICCID (SIM serial number), IMEI, phone number
- `Mddata` files (hashed filenames) are backed up application resources
 - SMS database, contacts, etc.
 - Filename is a SHA1 hash of the full file path
- For encrypted backups, file content is protected

Viewing Plist Files



The screenshot shows a window titled "Info.plist - plist Editor for Windows". The menu bar includes "File", "Edit", "View", and "Help". The toolbar contains icons for opening, saving, undo, redo, copy, paste, and help. The "XML View" tab is active, displaying the following XML code:


```
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
2 <!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
3 <plist version="1.0">
4   <dict>
5     <key>Build Version</key>
6     <string>9A334</string>
7     <key>Device Name</key>
8     <string>Joshua Wright's iPad</string>
9     <key>Display Name</key>
10    <string>Joshua Wright's iPad</string>
11    <key>GUID</key>
12    <string>4FA693C78CDE4DADD8825BE56CED16F2</string>
13    <key>Last Backup Date</key>
14    <date>2012-01-14T14:04:29Z</date>
15    <key>Product Type</key>
16    <string>iPad2,1</string>
17    <key>Product Version</key>
18    <string>5.0</string>
19    <key>Serial Number</key>
20    <string>DN6GNRP2DKPH</string>
21    <key>Target Identifier</key>
22    <string>f51aa534989fb22f75aa41414be3ff233d614a1d</string>
23    <key>Target Type</key>
```

A yellow text box on the right side of the window contains the following text:

XML-based configuration data,
stored in ASCII or proprietary
binary packed data, accessible
with plutil on OS X or plist
Editor for Windows

The status bar at the bottom shows "Ready" on the left and "Line: 1 Col: 1" along with "CAP", "NUM", and "SCRL" indicators on the right.

SQLiteSpy



SQLiteSpy - E:\c8a61a43285a8a3617852d97d53c8619760b9e71\d1f062e2da26192a6625d968274bfda8d07821e4

File Edit View Execute Options Help

Name

main

Tables (4)

- bookmark_title_words
- bookmarks
- generations
- sync_properties

Collations (7)

bookmarks


id	special_id	parent	type	title	url
222	0	221	0	QuickTime guide	http://www.apple.com/quicktime/
223	0	221	0	Movie Trailers	http://www.apple.com/trailers/
224	0	221	0	Game Trailers	http://www.apple.com/games/trailers/
225	0	221	0	QuickTime TV	http://www.apple.com/quicktime/tv/
226	0	221	0	Hot Picks	http://www.apple.com/quicktime/hot-picks/
227	0	0	0	FAIL Blog: Pictures and Videos of Owned, Pwnd and Fail Moments	http://failblog.org/
228	0	0	0	Slashdot: News for nerds, stories, and more	http://slashdot.org/
229	0	0	0	Hacking with GnuRadio (Layman's Edition)	http://securitytube.net/Hacking-with-GnuRadio-Layman's-Edition/
230	0	0	0	Dictionary	http://i.word.com/
231	0	0	0	IGN Wireless: Best Story 2008	http://uk.bestof.ign.com/2008/wireless/
232	0	0	0	Chinese man gets 30 months in prison for hacking	http://mobile.networkworld.com/de/

FAIL Blog: Pictures and Videos of Owned, Pwnd and Fail Moments


All backup data is accessible, but decoding the data takes time

BlackBerry Backup

- Transfers configuration, local e-mail, contacts, calendar, etc. (IPD file)
 - Optionally also includes media resources (CAB file)
- Stored in %USERPROFILE%\Documents\BlackBerry\Backup



Magic Berry IPD Reader




Free database viewer, does not extract all useful content from IPD backup file

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
Device Passcodes

- To avoid lost device data loss, vendors provide a device passcode protection option
- Users enter device passcode each time they unlock the device
 - Limited number of failures before device wipe or exponential timer back-off
- Enforce device password requirement and passcode complexity with MDM
- Devices require password before backing up data



BlackBerry Device Passcode Attack

- When locked with a passcode, BlackBerry devices restricts access to the device
 - Must enter passcode to access device
 - Must enter passcode to backup on Windows
- Device passcode can be used to protect stored data on media card
- Attacker cannot access device or backup without passcode




BlackBerry Device Passcode Recovery

- BlackBerry devices can encrypt both flash and media card
- Device passcode commonly used to encrypt media card
 - Media card is transferable
 - Key is protected with passcode
- When configured to encrypt media card, susceptible to offline wordlist attack



Elcomsoft Phone Password Breaker

- Read encrypted key in
 \BlackBerry\
 System\info.mkf
- Mount passcode attack
 - Not susceptible to wipe
- 4-digit PIN recovery in near real time
 - Can also attack longer PIN's and passcodes with wordlist attack mode
- Key recovery permits device backup to access data



iPhone Data Protection Tools

- Open-source project based on reverse-engineering iOS encryption
- Modifies official iOS firmware IPSW files to create alternate boot environment
- Python tools to mount PIN attack against a connected device
 - iPhone up to 4S, iPad 1 and 2 support
- Device must be susceptible to jailbreak

iPhone Data Protection Tools Setup and Attack

- Only supported on OS X, several steps for setup and configuration
- Outlined step-by-step at <http://www.willhackforsushi.com/ios-key-recovery.pdf>

```
$ ./demo_bruteforce.py
{'passcode': '1234', 'passcodeKey':
'2a98c5c7649352b5b90b9d69a8d213216b3693965ce15817cac11240aaaaaaaa'}
$ ./keychain_tool.py -d keychain-2.db 066ca6f0c178b7e7.plist
Keybag: SIGN check OK
Keybag unlocked with passcode key
Keychain version : 5
-----
                          Passwords
-----
Service :      EnhancedVoicemail
Account  :      4015242911
Password :      1111
```

Tool output
modified for space

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Device Passcode Recommendations

- All devices must use a passcode to prevent unauthorized access, backup
- Length of passcode will be contentious within organizations
 - Should be designed to thwart attacker sufficiently for remote countermeasures to be issued
 - iOS 4 character PIN: 13 minutes to recover on average
- Consider alphanumeric passcodes for added entropy
- For BlackBerry, do not rely on device passcode alone for encryption
 - Use device passcode and device key

Device passcode alone will not thwart determined data access attempts against a lost or stolen device

Remote Wipe Strategies

- When lost, remote data wipe can be effective to limit data exposure
- For corporate devices, this is a simple calculation
- In BYOD deployments, remote wipe may not be an option to end-user
- Container MDM controls works well here, wiping only container data
 - Can be applied much more liberally, wiping corporate data following policy violation, etc.

It is common for end-users not to want to believe the mobile device is lost, delaying the reporting process and exposing the organization. A removed SIM card largely mitigates remote wipe effectiveness.

Encouraging Lost Device Reporting

- Educate users to a policy to report lost devices right away
- Promote policy through posters and other media in the organization
- Help users recognize that the penalty for lost devices is minimized when reported quickly

LOST



It happens to the best of us. Report a lost phone, tablet or laptop to the IT Helpdesk at 401-555-HELP right away.

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Mobile Device Security



- A growing skill set requirement for small and large organizations
- Required for deployment and rollout
 - Also required for on-going application analysis, incident response, maintenance, monitoring
- Rapidly changing area of information security
 - (Many past problems are repeated)
- Great opportunity for professional career development
 - Plus, it's a lot of fun, and we get to mess around with cool toys

Essential Skill Development

- Developing policies that meet business needs and user acceptance
- Adoption of security controls to mitigate attacks and common threat scenarios
- Analysis of network activity from mobile devices and applications
- Exploitation of wireless client implementation flaws
- Manipulation of mobile device apps and supporting servers

SANS Security 575: Building the skills necessary for effective mobile device security

Resources

- SANS SCORE Mobile Device Checklist - www.sans.org/score/checklists.php
- Plist Editor for Windows - www.icopybot.com
- iPhone Data Protection Tools - code.google.com/p/iphone-dataprotection
- Elcomsoft EPPB - www.elcomsoft.com/eppb.html
- Magic Berry IPD Reader - menastep.com
- SQLiteSpy - www.yunqa.de/delphi/doku.php/products/sqlitespy

Up-to-date information about SEC575 -
www.sec575.org

SANS Security 575: Mobile Device Security and Ethical Hacking

- SANS Conference Events
 - VA Beach 8/20 - 8/25 (Joshua Wright)
 - Las Vegas 9/17 - 9/22 (Joshua Wright)
 - Baltimore 10/15 - 10/20 (Joshua Wright)
 - London 11/26 - 12/1 (Raul Siles)
- SANS vLive and OnDemand delivery coming soon

Thank You For Attending. Questions?